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Background
Cleveland’s progress can be intimated through a variety of topics. Some topics—like “globalization,”
“innovation,”, “deindustrialization”, and “pandemic”—seem big and distant, while others are less abstract
and more local, such as “jobs,” “income,” “housing,” “policing”, “education,” and “health”. Then there
are some topics that are viscerally personal, if only because the direct impact they have on the mind and
body. These include “foreclosure,” “lead,” “infant mortality,” “opioids,” “police brutality”, and
“pneumonia”.
While these issues are of topical concern in their own right, their vastness in scope can be disorienting to
those charged with guiding progress. No doubt, a multitude of efforts exist to gather data and distill
information on Ohio, be they academic, non-profit, or journalistic. In turn, initiatives are kicked off to
spur solutions in receipt of said information. But these initiatives often struggle to find footing. This is
partly because we lack a theory of change that ties various threads of information into a body of
knowledge, and ultimately a collective vision.
Put another way, everything is connected: the global, the local, and the individual. The COVID-19
pandemic is a hard-charging testament to that fact, as is the murder of George Floyd in which an assault
on a Minneapolis street rippled into marches on the world’s streets. And the quicker we can elucidate
those connections, the faster that collective efforts can move beyond intention and action and into
individual impact.
This is no small task. Problems, after all, are structural, while solutions are local. Care is thus needed in
the analysis of each, if only because many of our problems are not in our control, yet the “fix” to those
problems must be.
The following is a policy white paper called “The Future of Growth”, created through a partnership
between Cleveland State’s Center on Urban Theory and Analytics and Rust Belt Analytica. The goal is to
simplify the complex of how and why the global economy changes, examining how those changes impact
regional economies, neighborhood conditions, and ultimately individual well-being. Along the way,
assumptions are challenged. For example, is population growth an accurate way to measure progress? Or
do measures of productivity and longevity offer a better strategic approach? The former presumes that it’s
the quantity of lives that matters, whereas the latter suggests it’s about the quality of life.
With this and other data in hand, the intent is to scaffold the information it into a collective awareness of
where Cleveland is, where it was, and where we need to be. Importantly, the result of this effort is
intended to go beyond an ability to make better-informed decisions via the stacking of facts. Progress is
less linear than that. It is equally about busting out of old paradigms of thought. As the theoretical
physicist David Bohm put it: “The ability to perceive or think differently is more important than the
knowledge gained.” If current events teach us anything, it’s that: thinking differently when the choice to
think differently was made for us.

PART 1: THE EVOLUTION OF GROWTH

Quantity of Lives V. Quality of Life
The “front door” to any economic inquiry is through the lens of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) defines GDP as “a comprehensive measure of U.S. economic
activity” that calculates “the value of the goods and services produced” in a given time at a specific
place1. That said, GDP is an imperfect measure, as are all standalone measures. Why that is will be
unpacked. Consider this initial section a level-setting. One that’s necessary, if rudimentary.
Nationally, Ohio’s economic output ranks 7th. While the state is no California, Texas, or New York,
having a top 10 economy in the world’s hegemonic power is significant at face value, and it represents as
an opportunity geography for the majority of the global population.
Figure 1: Largest State Economies by Total Real GDP. Source: BEA, 2018 (in 2012$)

Drilling down only enriches this perspective, especially regarding the economic impact of Ohio’s big
cities. The metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) of Cincinnati ($124.95 billion), Cleveland ($119.33
billion), and Columbus ($114.68 billion) rank as the 28th, 33rd, and 35th largest in the nation respectively
(out of 384 MSAs). What’s more, the GDP for the MSAs of Cincinnati, Cleveland, and Columbus as a
group equals $358.95 billion, making up 59.3% of the state’s total economic output.
A last slice of the data further disaggregates where Ohio’s economic output is sourced. The BEA just
released new figures showing total real GDP at the county level. They were the first of their kind.
Cuyahoga County’s total real GDP of $87.7 billion ranked as the 31st largest economy in the nation. That
puts Cuyahoga in the top one percentile (See Figure 2). In Ohio, Cuyahoga makes up nearly 15% of
Ohio’s GDP. Along with Columbus’ Franklin and Cincinnati’s Hamilton counties, the three bigcity counties represent over 40% of the state’s total output (See Figure 3).
The question now to turns to: “So what?” Will economic growth as a concept of magnitudes stand
the test of time? It’s a big question. One that will echo throughout.

1https://www.bea.gov/resources/learning-center/what-to-know-gdp

Figure 2: Top 1% of Counties by Total Real GDP. Source: BEA, 2018 (in 2012$)

Figure 3: Percent of Real GDP for State of Ohio by County. Source: BEA, 2018

***
What makes a place successful? The answer depends on the definition of “success”. One benchmark, total
GDP, was just examined. GDP, in turn, is a function of two factors: a growing labor force and a more
productive labor force. The former implies quantity, the latter quality. When we talk quantity in this
respect one thing inevitably comes to mind: population growth. The logic isn’t faulty. Figure 4 shows
there is a positive correlation between a metro’s population growth and total GDP. This makes sense:
grow people, grow consumption, grow growth.
Figure 4: Annualized Population Growth Rate v. Annualized Total GDP for all MSAs. Source: BEA, 2001
and 2018.
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For lay people and policymakers alike, population growth has become the default metric of success. If a
place is growing it’s succeeding, if a place is shrinking it’s not. This belief is undergirded by a bigger-isbetter bias that guides so much of human decision-making2. “[P]eople in the United States tend to have
an implicit association in memory that bigger is better,” note the authors of the study “When Bigger Is
Better (and When It Is Not): Implicit Bias in Numeric Judgments”. This leads people to associate higher
numbers with higher quality even in situations where it should not. The writer Elias Canetti referred to
this as the “modern frenzy of the increase.3”
A query of big city paper’s after the annual Census tally is illustrative. A bigger-is-better bias bleeds
through the finger-wagging headlines that follow:
“Cook County Sees Country's Largest Population Loss”, WBEZ Chicago, April, 20194.
“New York is losing residents at an alarming rate,” New York Post, December, 20195.
“California’s population growth is the slowest in recorded history”, Los Angeles Times, May, 20196.

2

https://academic.oup.com/jcr/article-abstract/44/1/62/2910770?redirectedFrom=fulltext
Crowds and Power By Elias Canetti
4
https://www.wbez.org/shows/wbez-news/cook-county-sees-countrys-largest-population-loss/d14c43e9-7ddb-4f2c-b27b1b19a3469ec1
5 https://nypost.com/2019/12/30/new-york-is-losing-residents-at-an-alarming-rate-report/
6 https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-population-growth-20190501-story.html
3

“Los Angeles County suffers nation’s worst population outflow,” Los Angeles Daily News, June, 20197.
Meanwhile, a sense of assuredness comes through in the headlines of fastest-growing places:
“Myrtle Beach is the second-fastest growing metropolitan area in the country, again”, ABC News 4,
April, 20198.
“Jacksonville Among Nation’s Fastest Growing Cities,” WCJT Jacksonville, May, 20199.
“Two Texas Oil Towns Among Metros with Fastest Population Growth,” Bloomberg, April, 201910.
“Census declares Meridian as 5th fastest-growing city,” Idaho Statesman, May, 201911.
But growth does not equal development. A place can add a quantity of people, yet still lose out on quality
of life; and vice versa: a place can lose a quantity of people yet gain on quality of life. It’s important, then,
to disaggregate from broad-brushed measures of success, such as population growth and total GDP. In his
Quartz piece “Stop obsessing about GDP growth—GDP per capita is far more important”, economist
reporter Dan Kopf discusses how total GDP growth is a misleading measure12. “A country’s aggregate
economic growth is not what matters,” he writes. “What matters is whether the people living in a country
are getting wealthier”. A better, albeit imperfect, measure is real GDP per capita, calculated as total
economic output divided by total population. It’s the most commonly accepted measure of a place’s
standard of living13.
A simple trend analysis
demonstrates this point. Regions in
the South and Southwest lead the
way in terms of a growing
population. The top seven fastestgrowing big-city metros from 2001
to 2018 are in the Sun Belt: Austin,
Las Vegas, Orlando, Houston,
Charlotte, Phoenix, and San
Antonio. The slowest-growing?
They are in the Rust Belt:
Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Detroit,
Providence, R.I., Chicago, St.
Louis, and Milwaukee.

Figure 5: Map of the Rust Belt and Sun Belt. Source: Richland
Source

But in terms of real GDP per capita,
a different reality comes into focus
(See Figure 6). In 2001, the regions’ GDP per capitas were nearly equal. By 2007, the Sun Belt ($56,188)
overtook the Rust Belt ($54,762). Since the Great Recession, though, the regions’ paths have diverged.
Today, the Rust Belt’s real GDP per capita ($59,073) is nearly $4.5k more than the Sun Belt’s ($54,604).

7

https://www.mercurynews.com/2019/06/25/la-county-nets-98608-more-departures-than-arrivals-nations-worst-populationoutflow/
8 https://abcnews4.com/news/local/census-myrtle-beach-is-the-second-fastest-growing-metropolitan-area-in-the-country
9 https://news.wjct.org/post/jacksonville-among-nation-s-fastest-growing-cities
10 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-19/two-texas-oil-towns-among-metros-with-fastest-population-growth
11
https://www.idahopress.com/meridian/news/government/census-declares-meridian-as-th-fastest-growingcity/article_dd86261d-7293-53cb-875f-bbec8fe2cf23.html
12 https://qz.com/1194634/the-world-bank-wont-stop-reporting-gdp-instead-of-gdp-per-capita-and-it-is-driving-me-crazy/
13 https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/page1-econ/2017/09/01/why-are-some-countries-rich-and-others-poor/

Figure 6: Real GDP Per Capita in the Rust Belt v. the Sun Belt. Source: BEA, 2001-2018
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A similar story unfolds when looking at Cleveland and Cuyahoga County. The metro’s real GDP per
capita increased from $49,280 to $58,010, just above the nation’s ($56,968). At the county level,
Cuyahoga County’s real GDP per capita increased from $57,518 to $71,325, ranking 67th out of the
nation’s most populous 500 counties.
Figure 7: GDP Per Capita for Cleveland MSA, Cuyahoga County, and the U.S. Source BEA (in 2012$)
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A last slice of the data looks at how real GDP per capita is growing across time. Figure 8 plots the
annualized growth rates of GDP per capita and total population for all 384 metros since the Great
Recession. There is no correlation between population growth and productivity increases (R2 = .138). For
instance, the metro of Myrtle Beach, S.C.—which ranked near the top in total population growth—had a
declining real GDP per capita since 2010 (from $32.4K to $30.9K). Such are the “growth-withoutprosperity” cities (lower-right quadrant). Cleveland, however, is in the upper-left quadrant, characterized
by metros that lag in population growth but lead in productivity growth. Cleveland’s population growth
rate of -0.11% is far below the average of all metros (0.83%), but its real per capita GDP growth rate of
1.47% is higher (1.38%). Other big-city metros in this category include Pittsburgh, Chicago, Detroit, and
Los Angeles.

Annualized Growth Rate Per Capita GDP

Figure 8: Annualized Population and Real GDP Per Capita Growth for all MSAs, 2010-2018. Source: BEA
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County-level trends paint a similar picture (See Figure 9). Cuyahoga County’s annualized population
growth rate since 2010 was -0.3%. That’s below the national rate of 0.7%. But its real GDP per capita
growth (1.92%) was higher than the national rate (1.54%).

Annualized Growth Rate Per Capita GDP

Figure 9: Annualized Population and Real GDP Per Capita Growth for Big-City Counties, 2010-2018.
Source: BEA
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The literature on population versus productivity growth—or quality versus quantity—isn’t new. In a 2002
Brookings paper, economist Paul Gottlieb analyzed whether it was possible for regions to “grow without
growth”14. His investigation answered in the affirmative. A decade later urbanist Richard Florida updated
a version of the analysis for the Atlantic15. His takeaway?
“A rising population can create a false illusion of prosperity, as it did in so many Sunbelt metros, which
built their house-of-cards economies around housing construction and real estate development…The
south and the west may be winning the demographic race, but America’s economic winners are the places
that have improved their productivity—something which doesn’t turn on the sheer numbers of workers
they have on tap, but rather on how skilled and innovative they are.”
The Evolution of the Global Economy
A Theory of Change
Knowledge drives economic growth. It does so two ways: by being applied
to existing processes so there’s efficiencies in the making of goods and
delivery of services (think robots and car making); and by fueling
innovation, leading to next-order processes (think artificial intelligence and
driverless cars). Successful cities have economies that are knowledgebased. The regions with the nation’s highest real GDP per capita, for
instance, are all recognized as knowledge economy “hotspots” (See Table
2).

Table 2: Top 5 Real GDP Per
Capita, Largest 40 MSAs.
Source: BEA, 2018.
Metro
2018
San Jose, CA

$159.6

San Francisco, CA

$105.1

Seattle, WA

$90.3

Boston, MA

$84.7

That a city can be successful or not implies their economies evolve, or else
New York, NY
$79.4
get left back. There are numerous theories describing this evolution, but
one theory in particular is helpful. It’s an “evolutionary economics”16 concept called the “Four Sector
Theory”17. It explains that the global economy had a “Primary” stage that was natural resource-driven
(circa 1800s), leading to a “Secondary” stage that was industrially-driven (circa 1940s), followed by a
“Tertiary” stage which is one of service provision. In Cleveland this meant an economy backstopped by
the likes of Standard Oil in the late 1800s, to Ford in the mid-20th century, to Cleveland Clinic today.
The latest, most emergent stage, “Quaternary”, is all about the cutting-edges of technology. Think big
data, computer processing, and artificial intelligence, and the resultant impact they have not only on
market activities, but on human well-being. To date, so-called “big tech” firms are the purveyors of the
Quaternary era, as are the academic entities that drive the R&D that advances techne’s commercial use18.
Table 3 illustrates tech’s rising dominance, showing the top
firms by market capitalization over a hundred-year period.
Note the evolution of the highest-valued firms and their
position in the marketplace: going from natural resource
(Primary) and raw materials (Secondary) in 1919, to tech’s
capital accumulation via the likes of Apple, Alphabet,
Microsoft, and Amazon (Quaternary).

Table 3: Top firms by market capitalization,
1917 and 2017. Source: S & P 500
1917
2017

Standard Oil of N.J. (Oil)

Microsoft (Tech)

Just as firms rise and fall in harmony with economic change,
so do the cities where these firms exist. Where a given city
rests on this evolutionary continuum can be gauged by

Bethlehem Steel (Steel)

Amazon (Tech)

Armour & Co. (Food)

Berkshire Hathaway
(Conglomerate)

14

U.S. Steel (Steel)
American Telephone &
Telegraph (Telecom)

Apple (Tech)
Alphabet (Tech)

https://www.brookings.edu/research/growth-without-growth-an-alternative-economic-development-goal-for-metropolitanareas/
15
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/04/the-metro-story-growth-without-growth/73368/
16 https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674272286
17 Fisher, Allan GB. "Production, Primary, Secondary and Tertiary." Economic Record 15.1 (1939): 24-38
18 https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691117164/cities-of-knowledge

looking at what industries drive their GDP19. The BEA segments GDP into industries using the North
American Industry Classification System (NAICS)20, which can then be classified into the Primary,
Secondary, Tertiary, and Quaternary sectors (See Table 4)21. The more an economy is driven by Tertiary
and Quaternary sectors, the more they have gone through “economic restructuring”22—a term denoting an
evolution from a labor- to knowledge-based activities.
Figure 10: Share of Total Real GDP by Sector for United States, 2001 to 2018. Source: BEA.
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The evolution of the national economy since
2001 is shown in Figure 10. The nation’s
compositional share of GDP from the Natural
Resources, or Primary, sector has stayed low:
from 3.6% to 4.3% (See Figure 10). The share of
GDP from the Manufacturing, or Secondary,
sector has declined, going from 20.7% to 17.2%.
Note, though, the emergence of the Information
Technology, or Quaternary, sector, accounting
for 15.9% of GDP, up from 11.5% in 2001. Still,
the U.S. is a predominantly service-oriented
economy, comprising 62.8% of GDP. These
trends are in line with the evolutionary theory
espoused above.

Table 4: Industry NAICS Codes Classified into Sectors
Primary

Natural resources and mining

Secondary

Construction
Manufacturing
Utilities
Wholesale trade
Transportation and warehousing
Retail trade
Accommodation and food services

Tertiary

Economic Evolution in Cleveland and Other
Iconic Cities

Other services (except government and
government enterprises)
Administrative and support and waste
management and remediation services
Educational services and Health care
Management of companies and enterprises

Many places, including Cleveland, have gone
through the first economic restructuring from
Manufacturing to Services. Fewer places have
gone through the second economic restructuring
from Services to Information Technology. The
latter restructuring has been dubbed “The Fourth
19

Finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and
leasing
Arts, entertainment, and recreation
Quaternary

Information
Professional, scientific, and technical services

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s00181-011-0510-z.pdf
https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/
21 Note: The BEA classifies industries into goods-producing (Secondary) and service-providing (Tertiary). This analysis further
breaks this down using the Four Sector Theory. To do this, Natural resource and mining is classified as Primary, and information
and professional, scientific, and technical services are classified as Quaternary. All other categories fall into BEA’s original
designations.
22 https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/july-1993/restructuring-and-economic-growth-taking-thelongterm-view
20

Industrial Revolution”, described as a set of technologies “such as artificial intelligence, genome editing,
augmented reality, robotics, and 3-D printing, [that] are rapidly changing the way humans create,
exchange, and distribute value.”
Though the U.S. is just entering the most emergent era, there are select places, like Santa Clara County—
home to Silicon Valley—and San Francisco County that are already there. Figure 11 shows the GDP
composition by sector for Santa Clara. Information Technology accounts for 41.4% of GDP, surpassing
the Service sector (31%). Manufacturing, due to tech-driven products like semiconductors and robotics,
remains strong, up to 28% of GDP. San Francisco County trends are not dissimilar, outside of
Manufacturing (See Figure 12). The compositional share is shifting from the Service economy to
Information Technology, with Services going from 68.6% of total GDP to 50.7%, whereas
Information Technology growth continues apace, now up to 42.6%.
Figure 11: Share of Total Real GDP by Sector for Santa Clara County, 2001 to 2018. Source: BEA
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Figure 12: Share of Total Real GDP by Sector for San Francisco County, 2001 to 2018. Source: BEA
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What these economic shifts in Northern California mean “on the ground” are varied in their ramifications.
A recent New York Times piece “San Francisco Restaurants Can’t Afford Waiters. So They’re Putting
Diners to Work” is fitting23. Rising technologist incomes has meant a white-hot real estate market, which
23

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/dining/san-francisco-restaurants-service.html

has had a trickling down effect on how San Franciscans consume goods and get services. “Commercial
rents have gone up,” notes the New York Times’ Emily Badger. “Labor costs have soared. And restaurant
workers, many of them priced out by the expense of housing, have been moving away.” The economic
output, then, that would otherwise come from waiters and waitresses is being partly absorbed by the “doit-yourself” economy, i.e., diners serving themselves. Such are the paradoxes of progress that come with
advanced economic restructuring, chiefly among them: economic and residential displacement.
Trends in Ohio are less advanced. Figure 13 shows Manufacturing as a percent of total GDP declining
from 27.8% to 22.6%, whereas the Service economy is responsible for 64.1%. But Ohio’s Information
Technology output (9.6%) is below the national rate of 15.9%, suggesting the state as a whole is not
keeping up with subsequent waves of innovation.
Figure 13: Share of Total Real GDP by Sector for Ohio, 2001 to 2018. Source: BEA
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Cuyahoga County’s Information Technology economy is performing a little better (13.4% of total
output), but the county’s entrée into the Fourth Industrial Revolution is still nascent (See Figure 14). As
expected, Manufacturing as a share is down from 19.7% to 14.4%, whereas the Service sector accounts
for over 72% of total GDP.
Figure 14: Share of Total Real GDP by Sector for Cuyahoga County, 2001 to 2018. Source: BEA
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But not all services are created equal. There are Blue-collar Services, like transportation and warehousing;
Lower-wage Services, like accommodations, food service, and retail; and Knowledge-based Services, like
healthcare and finance24. To the extent Cuyahoga County is still economically advancing entails assessing
how much of its services are increasingly knowledge-oriented. In 2001, 41.9% of the county’s total real
GDP was from Knowledge-based Services (See Figure 15). By 2018 that number accounted for 47.4%.
Figure 15: Breakdown of Cuyahoga County’s Service Sector as Composition of GDP
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Disaggregating, over 83% of Cuyahoga County’s Knowledge-based sector can be accounted for by two
industries: finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) and healthcare (See Figure 16). Those two industries
alone accounted for nearly 40% of the county’s total real GDP.
Figure 16: Breakdown of Cuyahoga County’s Knowledge-Based Services as Composition of GDP
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So, can Cuyahoga County be characterized as the proverbial knowledge economy? No doubt. A
comparison to a service economy that is less knowledge-based is helpful. Las Vegas’ Clark County is
nearly 82% Services and only 10.1% Information Technology (See Figure 17). The county’s Lower-wage
Service sector, in turn, is nearly 32% of its total GDP (See Figure 18), compared to 13.2% for Cuyahoga
County. This helps explain why Cuyahoga’s GDP per capita of $71.3K is nearly 25K more than Las

24

Note: Blue-collar Services include Utilities, Wholesale Trade, and Transportation and Warehousing. Lower-skill Services
include Retail Trade, Accommodation and Food Services, Administrative and support and waste management and remediation
services, and Other services. Knowledge-based Services include Finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing, Education
and Healthcare, Management of Companies and Enterprises, and Arts and Entertainment.

Vegas’ Clark County ($48.3K), and why the latter’s annualized GDP per capita growth rate (0.68%) is a
third of Cuyahoga’s (1.94%) since 201025.
Figure 17: Share of Total Real GDP by Sector for Clark County, 2001 to 2018. Source: BEA
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Figure 18: Breakdown of Clark County’s Service Sector as Composition of GDP
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It wasn’t supposed to be this way. In his 2002 book “Neon Metropolis”, UNLV historian Hal Rothman
posited that Las Vegas provided a model for post-industrial American cities in the era of the service
economy26. Las Vegas, he argued, was proliferated with unionized service jobs that employed the
working class. But that model was based exclusively on “end-of-the-food-chain” activities: eating,
drinking, construction, and hospitality. And as the old axiom goes, you cannot consume if you don’t
produce. In fact, over-leveraged leisure and hospitality economies that require personal contact will bear a
lot of the hurt for the foreseeable future due to contagion concerns related to COVID-19.
What big-city counties, then, offer a better roadmap of where Cleveland go in terms of an economic
evolution? Boston’s Middlesex County and Pittsburgh’s Allegheny County are useful parallels. They are
two regions with rich industrialist histories which, in turn, have given rise to world-class hospitals and
universities. It’s a lineage that has spurred technological advance via a keen development and use of
computer science departments in the likes of MIT and Carnegie Mellon27. Figure 19 shows Middlesex
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County is further along in its economic evolution, with 33.9% of its GDP from Information Technology.
Allegheny County, too, has a rising Information Technology sector, up to 19.2% of total GDP.
Figure 19: Share of Total Real GDP by Sector for Middlesex County, 2001 to 2018. Source: BEA
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Figure 20: Share of Total Real GDP by Sector for Allegheny County, 2001 to 2018. Source: BEA
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Boston’s and Pittsburgh’s shared history and emergence is in fact playing out in the strategic policy
space, with a partnership tentatively called the “AI Triangle” in the works. In accordance with the
University of Montreal, the so-called “600-mile commute” is being billed as an affordable option to
Silicon Valley28.
It’s a strategy that is increasingly making sense. Just as manufacturing deconcentrated from the Northeast
and Midwest due to price constraints in the mid-20th century, so too is technology increasingly decamping
from Northern California. “Our concentration in San Francisco is not serving us any longer,” noted
Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey recently, “and we will strive to be a far more distributed workforce, which we
will use to improve our execution.29”
Post-COVID-19, Dorsey doubled down, announcing in mid-May that the stay-at-home policies enacted
for emergency purposes would be extended indefinitely for the vast majority of employees30. Other tech
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companies, such as Square, have followed suit, with Google’s work-from-home policies mandated until at
least 202131.
Such trends are all part of the “death of distance” movement wherein where one works and lives has been
decoupled32, with a place’s standard of living the “juice” for talent relocation. In this emergent movement,
economic and community development are no longer mutually exclusive, but self-reinforcing. A better
community attracts a teleworker whose firm exists in the ether of the internet, not in the bricks and mortar
of space. Yet that salary of the telecommuter has the same multiplier effect in the local economy,
supporting the likes of the mechanic, the butcher, and the cashier.
With the rise of COVID-19 and the social distancing practices becoming the new norm, expect these
“death of distance” trends to advance, affecting dense, costly, technologically-oriented cities the hardest.
The trend of inland Millennials, for instance, flocking to the coasts—one Brooklyn borough president
recently remarked that NYC’s new arrivals needed to “go back to Iowa, go back to Ohio”33—is now an
outdated migratory model. What’s was “in”—urban consumer amenities meant to attract newcomers—is
now “out”; and what was “out”—a city and state’s capacity to mitigate global risk via quick-witted policy
and logistics—is now “in”. Ohio’s reputation re: its COVID-19 response is not simply a public health
policy, but an economic development policy as well.
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PART 2: THE PROBLEMS OF GROWTH

Progress and Pain
The Great Decoupling
This analysis has so far benchmarked the size of the economy, or total GDP, as well as GDP per capita, a
standard-of-living measure.34 What’s been less discussed is how and why GDP is an insufficient measure,
if only because the end goal—growth—is so limitingly conceived.
“Our gross national product…counts air pollution and cigarette advertising and ambulances to clear our
highways of carnage,” noted Robert Kennedy in a campaign speech 196835. “It counts special locks for
our doors and the jails for the people who break them…Yet the gross national product does not allow for
the health of our children, the quality of their education, or the joy of their play.”
The original architect of GDP, Simon Kuznets, forecasted these shortcomings when he was preparing the
first national accounting system to the U.S. Congress in 1934. In his groundbreaking report, “National
Income, 1929–1932”, Kuznets was simultaneously torn by a nation’s need to chart progress, i.e., “an
index of productivity”36, and its ability to chart progress, even subtitling a section of his paper “Uses and
Abuses of National Income Measurements”. Decades later, his concerns only grew. “Distinctions must be
kept in mind between quantity and quality of growth…Goals for more growth should specify more
growth of what and for what.37”
Part of the problem is that while GDP can chart the quantity of things produced—and GDP per capita can
chart the average standard of living—what’s missing is a sense of how economic growth gets distributed.
Equitably or not?
This partly depends on job access. Labor is the means by which goods are made and services are
provisioned. But the rise of the Quaternary era has meant an increasing ability to automate tasks, from
assembling to packaging to servicing to translation to diagnostics. The choice for execs, then, to increase
output and reduce labor on one hand, or slow profit and bloat processes on the other, well, it often isn’t a
choice. Efficiency reigns. “[E]xecutives are spending billions of dollars to transform their businesses into
lean, digitized, highly automated operations,” explains Kevin Roose of the New York Times38. “They
crave the fat profit margins automation can deliver, and they see A.I. as a golden ticket to
savings…letting them whittle thousands of workers down to just a few dozen.”
But there are pains to said progress, particularly the disruption of labor markets. “As automation
substitutes for labor across the entire economy,” explains Klaus Schwab, founder of the World Economic
Forum39, “the net displacement of workers by machines might exacerbate the gap between returns to
capital and returns to labor.”
What does this gap look like? A return look at Silicon Valley’s Santa Clara County is revealing. It is
arguably the nation’s most advanced economy, a notion intimated by the popular moniker “becoming the
next Silicon Valley”. Cities everywhere want massive GDP growth across a range of high-tech fields.
What’s less alluring is that Silicon Valley’s growth is splitting from employment—a phenomena called
the “great decoupling” by MIT’s Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee40.
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Figure 21 shows the GDP growth in Santa Clara’s Information Technology sector since 2001, gaining by
a factor of 5. Meanwhile, employment in the sector remained relatively flat. Trends in the county’s
Manufacturing sector were even more divergent: GDP growth grew by a factor of 3.5, whereas
employment decreased in Santa Clara County by 70,500.
Figure 21: Santa Clara County’s Information Technology (or Quaternary) Sector, Employment v. Total GDP
(2001 = 100, in 2012$). Source: BEA, 2001 to 2018.
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Figure 22: Santa Clara County’s Manufacturing (or Secondary) Sector, Employment v. Total GDP (2001 =
100, in 2012$). Source: BEA, 2001 to 2018.
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The socioeconomic result? A bifurcation of the labor market and attendant income inequality. A recent
study noted that 9 out of 10 Silicon Valley workers earned less in 2017 than they did in 1997, with the
only wage gains going to the top 10%.41 Part of the reason is that the high-tech economy is a “winnertake-all” economy, wherein there are those who automate work and those whose work is automated—and
only one of those groups gets paid well.
This is to say, then, that an evolving economy doesn’t preclude a devolving society. In fact, some of the
most advanced U.S. economies are also the most unequal, according to data from the New York Fed42.
The regions with the highest inequality include San Jose, CA, New York, Houston, San Francisco, and
41
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Washington D.C. This was due to flat wages for those region’s middle- and lower-income workers,
coupled with rapid growth in wages for top earners.
Issues in the Rust Belt are also less than ideal, yet the extremes found in the likes of Silicon Valley are
more muted. This is partly because the Rust Belt’s tech economies are less advanced; that is, while the
economic growth trajectory of, say, Cleveland is flatter than Santa Clara County, so too are the “winnertake-all” effects. This doesn’t mean there aren’t trends of decoupling. Figure 23 shows that the total GDP
from Cuyahoga County’s Information Technology sector increased from 2001 (rising to an inflationadjusted $10.75 billion), yet employment in that sector decreased.
Figure 23: Cuyahoga County’s Information Technology (or Quaternary) Sector, Employment v. Total GDP
(2001 = 100, in 2012$). Source: BEA, 2001 to 2018.
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There’s less of a decoupling in Cuyahoga’s Manufacturing sector (Figure 24), if only because there’s
declines in both output and employment. Again, this coincides with Cuyahoga County’s evolution from
goods- to knowledge-based economy. As to the extent that evolution is a net positive societally, well, it’s
an open question. Yet one thing is certain: Becoming the “next Silicon Valley” is not a lofty ambition, if
in fact societal well-being is central to that ambition. In light of COVID-19 and the boiling social unrest
tied to the Black Lives Matter movement, how could it not?
Figure 24: Cuyahoga County’s Manufacturing (or Secondary) Sector, Employment v. Total GDP (2001 = 100,
in 2012$). Source: BEA, 2001 to 2018.
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Deindustrialization and the “Barbelling” of the Labor Market
Balancing the desires of firms with the needs of workers and their communities is hardly a new problem.
“Technology is widely considered the main source of economic progress,” writes Joel Molkyr in “The
History of Technological Anxiety and the Future of Economic Growth: Is This Time Different?”, “but it
has also generated cultural anxiety throughout history.43” The famed economist David Ricardo put the
issue simply some 200 years back, noting that “the substitution of machinery for human labour is often
very injurious to the interests of the class of labourers . . . [It] may render the population redundant and
deteriorate the condition of the labourer.”44 More recently, philosopher Yuval Harari opined that the
increasing automation of labor would mean a “rise of the useless class”45, a play off of Richard Florida’s
ode to the knowledge worker dubbed the “rise of the creative class”46.
Enter the Rust Belt, a region whose label is central to the issue of economic dislocation. In his campaign
for a second term, President Ronald Reagan coined the famous tagline “Morning in America”. It was a
time when the Sun Belt was booming and when California was dreaming. Conditions in the Industrial
Midwest, though, were brooding. In a campaign stop at a Cleveland steel mill, Reagan’s opponent, Walter
Mondale, told the lunch-pail crowd that Reagan was "turning our great industrial Midwest and the
industrial base of this country into a rust bowl."47 The media reinterpreted Mondale’s comments as “Rust
Belt”—a moniker that lives today.
The Rust Belt by and large is a term about loss: the loss of a way to upward mobility, the loss of a way of
life. And as the age of industrialization gave way to the age of deindustrialization—a process denoting the
deleveraging of manufacturing activities via automation and off-shoring—the pain was most acutely felt
in Ohio, as well as other regions in the Great Lakes.
A few trend lines illustrate this point. In 1969, 43.4% of all private sector jobs in Ohio were in the
Manufacturing sector (See Figure 26). These figures were 41.3% in Cuyahoga County and 35.1%
nationally. By 2018, the percentage of jobs that were in Manufacturing was 17.5% in Ohio, 14.1%
nationally, and 12.4% in Cuyahoga County.

Figure 26: Percent of All Private Sector Employment that is in the Manufacturing, or Secondary, Sector.
Source: BEA, 1969-2018.
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Despite the declines, Ohio remains a top 10 state
when it comes to proportion of private sector jobs
that are in Manufacturing, along with four other
Midwestern states (See Table 5). Note, though, the
decline in share of manufacturing employment
across the board, telling of the maturation of the
industry.

Table 5: Top States for Concentration of Manufacturing,
or Secondary, Employment. Source: BEA, 2001, 2018.
2001
2018
Change
Indiana

27.2%

22.3%

-4.99%

Wisconsin

26.1%

21.1%

-4.94%

Iowa

22.6%

20.2%

-2.43%

25.6%
19.0%
-6.57%
Of course, the issue with deindustrialization is that Alabama
Arkansas
26.6%
18.6%
-8.00%
one’s means to make a living impacts one’s
Michigan
24.2%
18.5%
-5.71%
standard of living, with income a mediating factor
between (a) a better job and (b) a better life. Just
Kentucky
23.8%
18.5%
-5.29%
how vital was manufacturing in the lining of
Mississippi
25.7%
18.2%
-7.49%
pockets of Rust Belt workers? Very, as nearly
South Carolina
25.9%
17.6%
-8.32%
55% of all Ohioans earnings were from the
Ohio
23.0%
17.5%
-5.51%
Manufacturing sector in 1969. That figure was
51% for Cuyahoga County. Now, only 23.9% of Ohio’s earnings are derived from Manufacturing. In
Cuyahoga County that figure dropped to 15.5% (See Figure 27).

Figure 27: Percent of All Private Earnings from the Manufacturing, or Secondary, Sector. Source: BEA,
1969-2018.
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With the fading of one epoch, however, another emerges. world,” e“As evidenced by the economic
development history of mankind, evolution from an agricultural to an industrial and finally to a service
economy is a natural and inevitable process for a specific country and even for the whole xplains one
international economist, noting that the United States—though a later arrival to the Industrial Revolution
compared to Europe—was “the first country to shift to a ‘service economy’ in the middle of the twentieth
century”48. The reasons for this evolution are varied, yet include an outgrowth of specialized “whitecollar” services selling to industrial firms—think Don Draper from Mad Men pitching to Chevrolet—as
well as the emergence of a consumer class with disposable income which, in turn, demanded more
services, thus inciting the need for more service occupations.
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Figure 32: Proportion of Private Sector Jobs that are in Knowledge-based versus Lower-wage Services in
Cuyahoga County. Source: BEA, 2001 to 2018.
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Figure 33: Proportion of Private Sector Jobs that are in Knowledge-based versus Lower-wage Services in the
U.S. Source: BEA, 2001 to 2018.
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Figure 34: Proportion of Private Sector Jobs that are in Knowledge-based versus Lower-wage Services in
Ohio.
Source: BEA, 2001 to 2018.
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Ohio’s evolution compares well to peer states, ranking 16th in Knowledge-based Service jobs as a percent
of private employment. Figure 35 shows that the more knowledge jobs a state has the higher its real per
capita income (R2 = .54). Ohio is in the upper-right quadrant, clustering with states in the Northeast. The

fast-growing jobs hubs in the Sun Belt states are mainly in the lower-left, echoing earlier findings that it’s
the quality of jobs that matter, not the quantity.
Figure 35: Real Per Capita Income v. % of Knowledge-based Service Jobs by State. Source: BEA, 2018.
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Leading the charge in Ohio is Cuyahoga and Franklin Counties. Among counties with at least 1 million
residents, Cuyahoga County ranks 7th in the proportion of jobs that are in Knowledge-based Services,
behind Philadelphia, Brooklyn, Manhattan, the Bronx, Nassau, and Allegheny. Franklin County is 10th.
Figure 36: Proportion of Private Sector Jobs that are in Knowledge-based Services in Big-City Counties.
Source: BEA, 2018
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Expectedly, Cuyahoga County lags in its proportion of private sector employment that is in the
Information Technology sector (9.9%). Topping the list of big-city counties is Fairfax County in the D.C.
metro, as well Santa Clara County and New York County. New York County is home to Manhattan,
which houses the world’s largest Fin Tech scene. Leading in the Great Lakes is Oakland, Michigan, home
to a growing Car Tech scene.

Figure 37: Proportion of Private Sector Jobs that are in Information Technology in Big-City Counties.
Source: BEA, 2018
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Which brings us back to income.
Table 6: Cuyahoga County Employment versus Earning Share
Deindustrialization’s impact on local
Source: BEA, 2018.
income was noted. Increased earnings for
Sector
Employment
Earning
Difference
Share
Share
Cuyahoga County’s knowledge workers,
Secondary,
12.4%
15.5%
3.1%
however, have helped pick up the slack.
Manufacturing
Earnings for Knowledge-based Services
Tertiary, Blue-collar
9.2%
10.7%
1.5%
($19.8 billion) grew an inflation-adjusted
Tertiary, Lower-wage
29.1%
16.7%
-12.4%
80% since 2001, and 45% for Information
Tertiary,
Knowledge39.3%
40.4%
1.1%
Technology ($7.3 billion). Those two
based
sectors alone account for over half of
Quaternary, Information
9.9%
14.9%
5.0%
earnings (55.3%) (See Table 6). The issue
Technology
is with Lower-waged Service workers.
They make up a big portion of the labor pool (29.1%), yet they get only 16.7% of private earnings.
***
Now, what do these trends mean? The takeaway? Well, we got an economic restructuring from
Manufacturing to Services that began some time back, dislocating Rust Belt workers from living wages.
MIT’s David Autor recently showed that much of the working class didn’t “graduate” into knowledge
economy work, but instead became subsistent on lower-wage service work49. A “barbelling” of the labor
market thus ensued, with knowledge workers on one end and service workers on the other. The father of
term “knowledge economy”, Peter Drucker, envisioned such a scenario. “Knowledge workers and service
workers are not ‘classes’ in the traditional sense,” Peter Drucker wrote in 199250. “But there is a danger
that … society will become a class society unless service workers attain both income and dignity.”
Pre-COVID-19, the scholarly argument for service worker wage stagnation was that pay was commiserate
with returns to skill. The wage premiums are for those in the techne class, or for the arbiters of knowledge
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services, as they provide the value-add in the current economic era. That’s true51. But only partly, as that
valuation came to coincide with a devaluation of manual, last-mile work as an unglamorous, rudimentary
endeavor52. Yet COVID-19 exposed that devaluation as self-serving. In fact, as knowledge workers work
from home in the safety of physical separateness, they can only do so if the necessities brought to their
doorstep—sanitation, food, utilities—are in fact brought. If not, the knowledge stops.
This reality is being realized. In his daily letters to his staff dated April 8th, 2020, Craig R. Smith, the
Chair of the Department of Surgery in New York City’s Columbia Medical Center, discussed the risk
associated with transporting COVID-19 patients from the ER in the infectious disease wing, noting the
orderlies are selflessly stepping up53. His concluding paragraph reads:
“Transport is just one reminder that every contribution matters. Consider this admirably prideful Tweet
from “Jester D” on March 14: ‘I’m a garbageman. I can’t work from home and my job is an essential
city service that must get done….Doctors and nurses are going to keep doctoring and nurse-ering. Us
garbagemen are gonna keep collecting the garbage.’ Indeed, it must get done. Singer-songwriter John
Prine died of COVID-19 yesterday, at age 73. He worked a day job as a mail carrier in Chicago for five
years early in his career. John Prine wrote songs for common people… ‘The scientific nature of the
ordinary man / Is to go out and do the best you can.’

The Post-COVID Break: Economic Dislocation of the Economically Displaced
Technology is not an industry per se. Rather, it’s deployed across industries, adding an element of
“creative destruction”54 into how things have traditionally been done. The Quaternary sector, then,
penetrates all economic activities, adding efficiencies with “PrecisionAg” in the Primary sector, robotics
in the Secondary sector, and precision medicine and FinTech in the Tertiary sector.
“Once upon a time, it made perfect sense to talk about ‘the high tech industry’ in America,” explained
technologist Anile Dash, noting that Fairchild Semiconductor and IBM were in the business of making
tech for tech’s sake55. “But today, the major players in what’s called the ‘tech industry’ are enormous
conglomerates that regularly encompass everything from semiconductor factories to high-end retail stores
to Hollywood-style production studios.”
Prior to COVID-19, tech’s penetration in Tertiary, or Service, sector was deep, particularly in the arena of
consumer goods, i.e., consumer tech. Netflix brought the cinema to the house. Amazon brought the mall
to the house. Facebook brought the coffeeshop to the house. Google brought the library to the house.
Apple brought the desktop to one’s hand from which entertainment, consumer goods, and social
connection was brought to one’s house. Uber Eats brought the restaurant to the house. Beyond leisure and
retail, knowledge services, too, are being brought to the house, via the likes of telemedicine, remote
learning, and online banking and brokering.
This is not surprising. The whole rationale for creative destruction is to make what was harder easier, or
what was scarce more abundant. The 2nd Agricultural Revolution was about making more food at less cost
with fewer laborers. That happened. The 1st Industrial Revolution made the scarcity of human labor
abundant by replicating it with steam and gears. Transportation, communication, domestic work: they
were made easier by cars, phones, and appliances which, in turn, was only made possible by the advances
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in electrification in the 2nd Industrial Revolution. One critical raison d'être of the 4th Industrial Revolution
is to make the scarcity of human attention less so via the advance of artificial intelligence.
Figure 38: A Timeline of Innovation. Source: Khazanah Research Institute

The arrival of COVID-19 will only accelerate technology’s penetration into various industries. That
means further automation of human tasks, and not simply for efficiency’s sake—i.e., robots doing more
for less—but because human proximity is now a drag on productivity, not to mention a liability. It’s a
scenario few saw. Worse, the endgame—how to do we work together without being together? —isn’t
exactly foreseeable. There’s no playbook for this. “Everyone wants to know when this will end,”
explained Devi Sridhar, a public health expert at the University of Edinburgh. “That’s not the right
question. The right question is: How do we continue?”56
Economically, the most pressing issue at hand is what to do about the human contact issue. A vaccine is
the obvious answer, yet that’s at least 12 months off—an eternity in the market. In the meantime, changes
must be made, and companies hurting for cash will find the pressure to replace humans with machines
intensifying. "The thing that we're hearing from customers is many of their budgets have been frozen
except for budgets for automation," explained CEO Melonee Wise of Take Fetch Robotics57. The
question their asking: “How can robots enable us to continue…while keeping social distancing?'"
It is unlikely, for instance, that farmers will return to business as usual. The living and working conditions
of seasonal migrant laborers makes their essential work susceptible to outbreaks, as is evidenced by the
situation in Singapore wherein half of their cases can be tied to migrant dormitories58. To mitigate such
risks, a considerable up-front investment is expected in “technologies like drones, autonomous tractors,
seeding robots, and robotic harvesters [that] imply a dramatic reduction in farmers’ reliance on migrant
labor,” so notes agricultural economist Wandile Sihlobo59.
And while American factories have been de-densifying for decades via the use of industrial robots, there’s
a substantial amount of last-mile work that didn’t make financial sense to automate. Amazon fulfillment
centers are filled with such workers. “But labor and robotics experts say social-distancing directives,
which are likely to continue in some form after the crisis subsides, could prompt more industries to
accelerate their use of automation,” so notes a New York Times piece “Robots Welcome to Take Over, as
Pandemic Accelerates Automation”. The authors interview an executive of an AI robotics company that
specializes in the recycling industry, saying orders have skyrocketed since the outbreak given that their
robots will enable recycling facilities to space out their employees. Another benefit of the bots? “They
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can’t get the virus,” the executive said60. Amazon, too, is planning accordingly, after numerous COVID19 cases among staff and subsequent staff protests61.
Perhaps the biggest effect—both economically and socioeconomically—is the fate of the Lower-wage
Service worker, making up a third of the American workforce. Elaborating, if COVID-19 acts as an
accelerant into Consumer tech’s penetration into the Service market, where do the economically displaced
go if they are again economically displaced? Cashiers are at risk via automated kiosks, retail workers via
on-demand ordering, waiters and waitresses via the rise of “dark kitchens”, or digital-only establishments
that don’t need a dining room or waiters.
Outside of automation, how does a leisure and hospitality industry so reliant on face-to-face contact even
continue?
Trends in the unemployment rate for leisure and hospitality workers show that it doesn’t, with
Depression-level unemployment rates nearing 40% for the group (See Figure 39). Even after the
lockdown, an already uphill climb for small businesses will be steep. “Keeping tables apart, socially
distant service… that’s not a reality,” notes one Cleveland restaurateur, explaining his reason to close. “If
you can’t make money turning every table twice and a half, how are you going to do it at half that.62”
Figure 39: Unemployment Rate for Leisure and Hospitality Workers, 2001 to April 2020. Source: BLS.
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Regionally, some states and cities are more susceptible to this reality than others. Figure 40 shows that the
top 10 states with the highest concentration of Lower-wage Service jobs are primarily in the Sun Belt, led
by Nevada (44%), Hawaii (44%), South Carolina (39%), Mississippi (39%), Florida (38%), and Alabama
(38%). Ohio ranks 35th at 32.3%. Out of big-city counties over a million plus, the top 18 for the highest
share of private jobs in Lower-wage Services are located in the Sun Belt, led by Clark County Nevada
(47.1%) (See Figure 41). Nearly half of the counties in the top 10 are in Florida.
Even after lockdowns soften with preventive measures, the likelihood people attend public gatherings is
uncertain. Does this sound fun? “Every spectator goes through a kind of disinfection shower at the
entrance of the theater,” explains a German theater director based in South Korea63. “You keep your
clothes on, of course, but you don't really get wet either. It is a very thin spray. Every visitor has to have
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their temperature measured, everyone has to wear a protective mask over their mouth and nose for the
entire stay in the theater.”
Figure 40: Proportion of Private Sector Jobs that are in Lower-wage Services by State. Source: BEA, 2018.
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Figure 41: Proportion of Private Sector Jobs that are in Lower-wage Services in Big-City Counties. Source:
BEA, 2018
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Regardless, back in late April there was an increasingly raging debate about the health of the economy
versus the health of the people, particularly in population boomtown areas in which so much economic
activity can’t be done virtually and at a distance. The Lt. Governor of Texas, Dan Patrick, recently made
comments that went viral insinuating that the elderly would be willing to die if it meant Americans can
“get back to work”64. Speaking with CNN’s Anderson Cooper, the Mayor of Las Vegas, Carolyn
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Goodman, offered her city as a “control group” to assess the extent fatalities will occur if social
distancing measures are relaxed, if only so casinos and hotels can open.65 Georgia was the first state to
relax social distancing measures so non-essential businesses like bowling alleys, tattoo parlors, and hair
salons can open. This, despite the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases’ Dr. Anthony
Fauci advising that Georgia shouldn’t be “going ahead and leapfrogging into phases where you should not
be…” Not surprisingly, the effect of these efforts to open up early has led to a spike in COVID-19 cases
in the Sun Belt, led by Texas, Florida, California, North Carolina, Arizona, and Georgia by late June66.
No doubt, the economic pain bearing down on the brunt of American firms and workers is unprecedented,
as illustrated by national monthly initial unemployment claims across time (See Figure 42). But falsely
framing a solution to COVID-19 as zero-sum dichotomy that means sacrificing the life of some for the
livelihood of others, well, that neglects an awareness that it is in fact that kind of dichotomous thinking
that got us into this mess in the first place.
COVID-19 didn’t create the urgencies we face as much as reveal them. The physical and mental wellbeing of Americans have been declining for some time67. This is related to how various economic
restructurings has been good for some, and less good for most. And where one lands on that continuum of
pain versus progress is ultimately felt in one’s flesh. After all, it all ends up in the body.
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Figure 42: Initial Unemployment Claims (Monthly) Jan 1967 to April 2020.
Source: U.S. Employment and Training Organization
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The Body as Geography
If there was one metric to measure it “all”, what would it be? Nothing captures everything, and there are
many key measures like GDP, employment, and earnings that are necessary. Yet all of these are upstream
to an outcome that’s arguably most definitive: life expectancy. In fact, so much of civilization’s race to
progress is flattened into a Darwinian struggle to live longer with a higher quality of life. In Maslowian
psychology, this is couched as going beyond the basic needs of food, water, shelter, and safety, to
psychological needs of belongingness and esteem, and finally to self-actualization, or those pursuits of
creativity and spirituality that lend themselves to “a life well lived”.
But one’s life expectancy is not fully in the hands of the individual. If one conceives of the body as a
geography—and it is—then it’s easy to see how a mind and body is influenced by the household it lives
in. That influence, then, broadens at geographic scale: a household is tied to a neighborhood, a
neighborhood to a city, a city to a region and state, all of which are interlocked globally. COVID-19
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makes this nesting of space plain as day, fast-tracking the global-to-local-to-individual process in a
breathtaking manner. But while the contagion is fast, the systemic structures that make it land harder on
the vulnerable have been a long time coming.
Let’s start with the basics. Overall, life expectancy in the U.S. has not only plateued, but it’s declined for
three consecutive years68. Among the developed world, the nation is trending the wrong way (See Figure
43), assaulting the notion of American exceptionalism.
Figure 43: Life expectancy by nation 1980 to 2017 (U.S. in red). Source: OECD

What’s happening? Deindustrialization’s impact in particular—and the erosion of middle-income
employment more generally—has had an explanatory effect69. In their recent study "Life Expectancy and
Mortality Rates in the United States, 1959-2017" in JAMA, the authors find that stalled longevity is a
function of Americans aged 25 to 64 dying of drug overdose, alcohol abuse, and suicide. Importantly, the
deaths are geographically specific, with 8 of the 10 states with the largest number of excess deaths in the
Rust Belt or Appalachia, particularly in the communities of the Ohio Valley. "The notion that U.S. death
rates are increasing for working-age adults is particularly disturbing because it is not happening like this
in other countries," said Steven Woolf, the lead author70. "This is a distinctly American phenomenon."
Echoing these findings, Angus Deaton and Anne Case, authors of the new book “Deaths of Despair and
the Future of Capitalism”, found that “deaths of despair” have increased four- to five-fold for white, noncollege-educated middle-age adults since the 1990’s. For instance, 30-year-olds died by suicide, drugs, or
alcohol at a rate of 31 per 100k deaths in 1992, increasing to 147 per 100k in 2017. For 53-year-olds, the
increase went from 32 per 100k to 131 per 100k. Explaining their findings, Case noted71: "We don’t think
[American capitalism] is working for people without a four-year college degree — and that’s two-thirds
of Americans between the ages of 25 and 64."
One key trend supporting this thesis is the falling male labor force participation rate, going from 86.6% of
men employed in 1948 to 68.5% in March of 2020. It’s a sobering stat. The Philadelphia Fed recently
showed that it was men with a high school diploma or less that are dropping out of the labor force the
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most, and that this exit was not “a transitory event, in that the majority of men who reported not working
in a given month had also not worked over the previous year.”72
Figure 44: Male Labor Force Participation Rate Jan. 1948 to May 2020. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics
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Such trends, however, are hidden in plain sight, given the growth pundits’ laudation of a Dow Jones
Index that keeps breaking glass ceilings. But the stock market is not the economy73. Or as was shown
prior: growth doesn’t equal development, particularly when it’s being decoupled from opportunity.
What’s key at this point is that the delta between growth and opportunity gets played out societally,
especially at the level of the community. From there, it gets absorbed individually.
A “walk” down the scale of economic restructuring will prove helpful. Figure 45 shows counties in Ohio
with the highest proportion of jobs in Knowledge-based Services and Information Technology combined.
Unsurprisingly, the knowledge economy job hubs are located in the largest urban centers, led by
Delaware (49.8%), Hamilton (49.2%), Cuyahoga (49.1%), and Franklin (46.9%). Meanwhile, areas where
Lower-wage Service jobs are most concentrated are in South Central Ohio (See Figure 46). These
counties also have the lowest life expectancies at around 72 (See Figure 47). By contrast, Columbus’
Delaware county’s life expectancy is 82.4 and Cleveland’s Geauga County is 81.3.
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Figure 45: Proportion of Private Sector Jobs in Knowledge-based Services and Information Technology by
County. Source: BEA, 2018.

Figure 46: Proportion of Private Sector Jobs in Lower-wage Services by County. Source: BEA, 2018.

Figure 47: Life Expectancy by County. Source: County Health Rankings, 2020.

The geographic split evident between counties is also evident within a given county. Figure 48 shows
Cuyahoga County’s Lower-wage Service workers are most concentrated in predominantly Black
neighborhoods just north and south of Cleveland’s Health Tech Corridor: home to the region’s “eds and
meds” institutions. That said, the bifurcation of the regional labor market is manifested as a bifurcation of
the local housing market, a phenomenon called “residential sorting” by urban economists74.
Figure 48: Where Lower-skill Service Workers Live in Cuyahoga County. Source: LODES, 2017.
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The sorting, then, gets played out in the way amenities flow. Knowledge- and tech-worker neighborhoods
are flush with investment, manifest as a cornucopia of goods and services that check-off Maslow’s
hierarchy of needs: physical safety, healthy food, clean air and water, quality housing, good schools and
healthcare, pretty aesthetics and parks, a strong social fabric and concomitant information access, not to
mention the freedom from scarcity that allows the luxury of aspiration. Meanwhile, disamenities grow in
areas of isolation: violence and trauma, dirty air and water, deteriorating housing, poor schools and health
services, a social bond break with less information and support, and a lack of a psychological and spiritual
reprieve that comes with perpetually existing without enough.
The spatial split brings to mind a book by Thomas P.M. Barnett's called “The Pentagon's New Map”75.
For the expert geostrategist, the world is divided between two types of geographies: the “Core”, where
"globalization is thick with network connectivity, financial transactions, liberal media flows, and
collective security," and the “Gap”, or areas disconnected from globalization and defined by poverty, low
education rates and "the chronic conflicts that incubate the next generation" of instability. While Barnett’s
“haves and have nots” was conceived at the level of the nation-state, it need not stay there. There is a
Core and Gap between American regions, within regions, and even within neighborhoods. "We ignore the
Gap's existence at our own peril," concludes Barnett.
The sorting between amenity-rich and -poor communities ultimately ends up affecting longevity. This is
evidenced by Figure 49 showing the spatial inheritances of life expectancy in Cuyahoga County.
Premature death clusters in space as if they were a contagion. In many respects, they are. The field of
epigenetics, for example, shows how the environment, or the outside, modifies a person’s DNA, or the
inside76. Elaborating, structural economic changes globally manifest as socioeconomic inequalities
locally, igniting psychosocial stress that changes the body’s biology.
Figure 49: Life Expectancy in Cuyahoga County. Source: U.S. Small-area Life Expectancy Estimates Project
– USALEEP, 2010-2015.
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It’s a sequence that lingers intergenerationally. “Each exposure has effects that may persist across the life
course and in some instances may be transmitted to offspring via epigenetic inheritance,” notes the
authors of the essay “Biological memories of past environments: Epigenetic pathways to health
disparities.77” “Since epigenetic markings provide a ‘memory” of past experiences, minimizing future
disparities in health will be partially contingent upon our ability to address inequality in the current
environment.”
For the most part, this is not being done. Healthcare is often an “after the fact” industry, treating bodily
disease as oppose to the “upstream” impacts on the body. That’s not surprising. Health practitioners can
only do so much. They can treat sick individuals, but sick societies? That’s not up them. It’s up to “us”.
Regardless, what’s occurring isn’t exactly working. In 1970, life expectancy in the U.S. ranked 18th out
of 43 peer nations. With the latest figures from the OECD, U.S. life expectancy today ranks 28th. This,
despite the U.S. spending $9,507 per capita annually in healthcare services—the most among developed
nations. This discordance is plotted in Figure 50. Most countries with high spends have higher life
expectancies. Not in America. The nation stands exceedingly alone, despite having the best medical
institutions in the world.
Figure 50: Life expectancy versus health spending per capita. Source: OECD, 2017.
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Now, the nation is awash with the dying, with 200,000 coronavirus deaths expected by September78.
COVID-19 sped up the slowing-moving car crash of the economically displaced and their diseases of
despair and their chronic conditions. “When we someday tally up all the casualties of the coronavirus,”
writes Joe Pinsker in the Atlantic79, “the high number of older Americans among the dead will reflect the
sad, universal fact of physical decline. But for many of those who had underlying health conditions,
inequality will be the actual cause of death.”
Still, pandemics don’t afford the luxury of looking back. What it does offer is a respite from the delusion
that economic progress has not meant societal costs. For months, almost everyone was home and almost
everything stopped. The plagued grabbed us by the proverbial jowl and made us look in the mirror,
reflecting the fact that it’s the most economically and physically vulnerable that are out about, tending to
a capitalism that hasn’t been tending to them.
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PART 3: THE FUTURE OF GROWTH

From Knowledge Economy to Knowledge Society
Efficiency vs. Resiliency
In the “The Rise of the Knowledge Society”, management theorist Peter Drucker explained that
knowledge had historically been applied to being, or that manner of learnedness80. “Then it came to be
applied to doing. It became a resource and a utility.” Drucker noted that as the meaning of knowledge
changed so did the value society placed on it. “Knowledge had always been a private good,” Drucker
wrote. “Almost overnight it became a public good.”
Knowledge as a public good cut several ways. A quality public educational system ensured there would
be a supply of qualified workers going forward. Then there was the demand side of the equation, with
federal R&D funding seen as key to the formation of new industries that would not only birth companies
and grow jobs, but also better the quality of life. It was an effort jumpstarted just after World War II.
In a letter dated November 17th, 1944, President Roosevelt addressed Vannevar Bush, the Director of
Office of Scientific Research and Development, recognizing his group’s success in applying scientific
knowledge to “the technical problems paramount in war81”. “There is, however, no reason why the
lessons to be found in this experiment cannot be profitably employed in times of peace,” President
Roosevelt continued, noting that knowledge can be generated to improve national health and raise the
standard of living. Roosevelt concluded: “New frontiers of the mind are before us, and if they are
pioneered with the same vision, boldness, and drive with which we have waged this war we can create a
fuller and more fruitful employment and a fuller and more fruitful life.”
Makes sense. If knowledge can be federally-marshalled for security purposes, so can it for purposes of
prosperity.
A year later a report was produced called “Science: The Endless Frontier”, which conceived of the
National Science Foundation: an effort to fund the production of knowledge for the public good82. That
report kicked off an era in the 50s and 60s in which nearly 70% of all R&D was funded by the federal
government (See Figure 51). It was a time of discovery that laid the foundation for computer science, and
eventually today’s technological age.
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Figure 51: R&D Funding by Funding Source, 1953-2016. Source: NSF
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While that effort to tie science to economic development ushered in remarkable advances on numerous
fronts, a split was nonetheless created in the institutions where most public-facing knowledge was
produced, particularly academia. By the mid-20th century, scientists were given near-exclusive control
over the assertion of truths, explained Yale sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein83. Meanwhile, the
practitioners of humanistic knowledge—those seekers of “the good and the beautiful”—had to cede
standing. “Never before in the history of the world had there been a sharp division between the search for
the true and the search for the good and beautiful.”
The fault line in this split was in the field of economics. Though economics—as an abstraction of human
motivation and behavior in the milieu of the market —is by its nature a “soft” science, its practitioners
aimed toward making it empirically known84. So arose the notion of “homo economicus”, or the idea that
the “economic man” was a behavioral blank slate who was consistently rational and pursued their selfinterests optimally. Such assumptions were needed if economics was to be squeezed of its uncertainty.
After all, irrationality abhors a mathematical constant, and despite how much irrationality is baked into
the marketplace85—in form of “bubbles”, biases, fear, greed, misinformation, or just dumb luck—the
notion that the economy is just a sum of its predictable parts remains stubbornly unbending.
Meanwhile, as the notion of economic man became ideologically presumed, less knowledge was being
applied to understanding the values of the free market— or the “why” of profit—with more energy
devoted to understanding the process of valuation itself—or the “how” of profit. This is evidenced in a
shift in how R&D was funded. In 1980, both government and the private sector funded R&D at a 1:1
ratio. Today, over two-thirds of research is funded via business. This pivot has been referred to as the
“privatization of the public good”86.
It is a pivot that has been greased and grown by the field of management consulting, arguably the
purveyors of knowledge in today’s knowledge economy. Think McKinsey, Deloitte, Bain, etc. Such firms
exist to perfect the how of profit. McKinsey, for instance, does “execution, not policy”87, with various
consultancy tactics executed including outsourcing, lay-offs, and automation on the stakeholder-side; and
mergers and stock buybacks on the shareholder-side.
This “leaning-and-meaning” of the private sector was motivated by an aggressively normative belief that
executive managers are “the agent of the individuals who own the corporation…and his Primary
responsibility is to them,” so notes Milton Friedman in his famed 1970 New York Times piece “The Social
Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits. 88” That dogma has since became doctrine, made real
by the most standard of consultancy playbooks: efficiency as a means and profit as an end.
The execution of this worldview has had a profound impact on how and where money flows. The top 1%
of earners take home 20.5% of the national income, levels not seen since the Great Depression (See
Figure 52). Meanwhile, the salary and wages of all workers as a percent of GDP is down to 43.2%, after
peaking at 51.7% in 1969 (See Figure 53). Illustrating these effects locally, 69.5% of Ohioan’s incomes
were from salary and wages in 1969. In Cleveland, it was nearly 74%. By 2018, the percent of income
coming from the salaries and wages decreased to 51.2% in Ohio and 54.2% in Cleveland (See Figure 54).
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Figure 52: Top 1% National Income Share, USA, 1914-2018. Source: World Inequality Database
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Figure 53: Wages and Salary Income as Percent of Gross Domestic Product, 1947-2019. Source: Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis
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Figure 54: Percent of Total Income from Salaries and Wages, 1969-2018. Source: BEA
75%
70%
65%
60%

55%
50%
45%

U.S. Salaries and Wages

Ohio Salaries and Wages

Cleveland Salaries and Wages

What’s picking up the slack? Personal transfer receipts, defined as income payments to persons for which
no current services are performed and net insurance settlements. Sources include government aid from
Medicare, food stamps, unemployment benefits, and Social Security. Nearly 20% of Ohioan’s incomes

comes from such receipts today, up from 7% in 1969. In Cleveland, the increase went from 6.5% to
18.4%. If this is a rational market, one would loathe to see an irrational one.
Figure 55: Percent of Total Income from Personal Transfer Receipts, 1969-2018. Source: BEA
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Income from dividends, interest, and rent is also rising. This is money paid to select individuals,
particularly stockholders, lenders, and landowners. In 1969, 15% of total income in the U.S. was via these
sources. That’s up to nearly 21%. In the Cleveland metro, the increase went from 14% to 19.4%. Dubbed
“financialization”, this is essentially the process of money making money. The scholar Gerald Epstein
defines financialization as “the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and
financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies.89” Epstein explains
that the financialization of an economy—historically symptomatic of a declining hegemonic power—is
part and parcel with a shift in money “between capital and labor on the one hand, and between
management and workers on the other hand.” It thus partly explains the decline in income from salary or
wages across time.
Figure 56: Percent of Total Income from Dividends, Interest, and Rent, 1969-2018. Source: BEA
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As efficiency—or the how of profit—squeezed workers out of a livable wage, another negative
externality took hold: the system became so lean that it became gaunt, susceptible to natural forces, like
contagions and natural disasters, that don’t operate on timetables as a stock and flow. “[I]f there is a
single economic policy lesson to learn from the coronavirus pandemic, it is that the United States’
obsession with efficiency over the last half century has brutally undermined its capacity to deal with such
a catastrophic event,” notes management theorist Roger Martin in his Washington Post essay “The virus
shows that making our companies efficient also made our country weak.90”
Medicine, cotton swabs, meat, testing kits, reagents, sanitizer, toilet paper, ventilators, facial masks—
these necessities were unavailable when we needed them most, exposing the insufficiency with
efficiency. That’s because firms and cities become specialists in the production of few things, a concept
called “comparative advantage” by economists91. But these “things” are just bits in a broader supply
chain, and if something goes wrong in a given city—e.g., a region in Italy was one of a few that
manufactured cotton swabs for COVID-19 testing and was no longer able to make them92—then
bottlenecks occur. Bottlenecks, in turn, ignite chain reactions that only let the contagion compound,
because the virus couldn’t be tracked and traced.
A converse to efficiency is resiliency. Whereas efficiency is the continued “leaning-and-meaning” of
processes in an existing environment, resilience requires the ability to adapt to the unknown. “Resilient
systems are typically characterized by the very features—diversity and redundancy, or slack—that
efficiency seeks to destroy,” explains Martin93.
How do nations and cities become resilient? There are tactical approaches—which are fairly easy to
execute—and ideological approaches—which are not.
As for the tactical, there’s existing ways to build redundancies, or slack, in supply chains. The U.S.’
Strategic Petroleum Reserve, for instance, is well-stocked, with 635 million barrels of oil in salt caverns
available on the Texas and Louisiana coasts94. Conversely, the Strategic National Stockpile, or the
national repository of antibiotics, vaccines, chemical antidotes, antitoxins, and other critical medical
supplies, isn’t well-stocked. By April 9th, 90% of the federal stockpile of N95 masks were gone, with the
remaining 10% being withheld from States for federal healthcare workers95. This led States to outbidding
each other on the private market, with one medical supply company in New Jersey selling N95 masks at
500% over the list price, leading a competitor, 3M, to file a price-gouging lawsuit96. It’s a devastating
commentary on the economics of public health.
The solution, of course, is to buffer public health from the private market, which means understanding
that livelihood is an upstream driver of firm profit. No health, no workers, no customers, no profit.
Knowing this would provide the impetus needed to build the Strategic National Stockpile so resiliency is
baked into the system. It would also mean reshoring the production of goods that are of vital interest to
American well-being, particularly pharmaceuticals and other forms of medical manufacturing. Figure 57
shows significant declines in the output of pharmaceutical firms based in the U.S.
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Figure 57: Industrial Production: Pharmaceutical and medicine, 2000 to 2019 (Index 2000 = 100). Source:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US)
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Such trends have been worrying the American military brass, including Christopher Priest—head of the
Defense Health Agency. In a July 2019 speech to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Priest notes97:
The growing reliance of the U.S. on foreign sources for critical defense-related material is an issue that
must be addressed at the national level…The most effective way to address this issue is to use the entire
buying power of the federal government…to compel the nation’s pharmaceutical producers, as one
example, to maintain the necessary infrastructure and capabilities to independently meet U.S. domestic
defense needs, and to compensate the producers adequately for providing and maintaining these
capabilities.
Which bring us to the ideological shift needed. The private sector is wired for efficiency, not resiliency.
For the how of profit, not the why of profit. Resilience, conversely, is a public good—a good that can
only be assured via a clear-eyed, self-assured public sector. “In the relentless quest for increased
efficiency, which remains a key source of competitive advantage, the decisions made by individual
market actors will produce, in the aggregate, a less-than-optimal supply of resiliency, a public good,”
explains William Galston in the Wall Street Journal98. “To solve this collective-action problem,
government must act as a counterweight.” Increasingly, government hasn’t.
When Knowledge is Dumb
In his first inaugural address, President Reagan noted: "In this present [economic] crisis, government is
not the solution to our problem; government is the problem.99" With those words, President Ronald
Reagan launched the devolution revolution.
Across the pond, UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher would echo his sentiment in more controversial
terms: "Who is society? There is no such thing!100" Thatcher's quote is often taken out of context. Society
isn't an actor who can do things. The people and families who make up society can do things. Thatcher
continues: "[N]o government can do anything except through people and people look to themselves first."
What Reagan and Thatcher were referencing—the push and pull between the public, private, and the
individual—is what political economists had been studying for some time; namely, that there are three
entities that hash out the rules of our collective reality: government, the market, and civil society. Yet how
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“the sausage is made” has historically been done via the relationship between the government and the
market. This relationship, in turn, is driven by a dominant ideology.
The ideology is that of laissez-faire capitalism, or the belief that the “invisible hand” of the market knows
how to make a better society than government. If the rational, self-interested economic man was a value,
then laissez-faire is the policy paradigm that materializes it. Firm-friendly policies that subsequently
flowed from this pendulous shift from citizenry to corporate governance include the deregulation and
privatization of many public-facing industries, including transportation, utilities, healthcare, and
education101—not to mention the labor-displacing strategies like automation and outsourcing that were
discussed prior.
But a belief in laissez-faire capitalism as a prerequisite to progress requires a denial in how the sausage is
actually made. Take investment. Much of the core tech that entertains us was not created by today’s
consumer tech firms. It was created by government investment in the 50s and 60s, so notes Margaret
O’Mara in her book “The Code: Silicon Valley and the Remaking of America.102” In short, Silicon Valley
was a child of the Department of Defense, with vast amounts of dollars funneled into start-ups and
universities in a “race to space” with the Soviets. Still, that reality never took hold. An alternative reality
did. The “continuing irony,” O’Mara writes, is that “some of those most enriched by the new-style
military-industrial complex were also some of the tech industry’s most outspoken critics of big
government.”
Then there’s the reality of what happens when an efficient, laissez-faire market crashes because (1) it’s
not really efficient and (2) it’s not really hands off. A May 19th New York Times headline reads “Too Big
to Fail: The Entire Private Sector.103” The article goes on to explain that with the economy in lockdown,
the Federal Reserve has “essentially propped up entire financial markets” with its endless ability to buy
assets with freshly-printed money.” Put simply, in times of crises the market and government essentially
fold into themselves, with the latter providing the pouch for the former.
Then why does the laissez-faire dogma persist?
In his book “Narrative Economics: How Stories Go Viral and Drive Major Economic Events”, Nobel
Laureate economist Robert Shiller argues that it’s the stories we tell that drive economic policy, not fancy
models or laws of any social nature104. Shiller discusses how the efficiency doctrine—while kicked off by
the 1970 Friedman piece—matured into our reality post-1980. “Viral narratives need some personality
and story,” Shiller writes. “One such narrative involved movie star Ronald Reagan, who became a
household name as the witty and charming character of the highly popular US television show General
Electric Theater from 1953 to 1962…Reagan used his celebrity to launch a massive free-markets
revolution whose effects…are still with us today.”
This doesn’t mean data, information, or analytical models are meaningless. They’re not. It just means
something beyond science is needed in the policy space. “Forecasting is simply not a strength of the
species, we are much better with tools and narrative storytelling,” explains author Barry Ritholtz.
Numbers don’t move people toward insight and action. Rather, it’s the stories we tell that spark a sea
change105. After all, civilization was made around a campfire106.
Enter civil society, described in the Oxford Handbook of Civil Society as a “geometry of human
relations” meant to be relatively independent of both the government and the market, and which ensures
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“spaces in which the agency and imagination of individuals can be combined to address the key issues of
the day. 107” Civil society is operationalized in places like non-profits, academia, labor unions,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), community groups, and foundations.
Importantly, civil society arose in response to the tension between economic and societal aims. But how
it’s been operationalized has been less than ideal. The civil society was conceptualized as an additional
category to the government and market: a source of both value and values. But it has “been relegated to
the status of a residual”, notes the scholar Michael Edwards, often operating in a transactional capacity to
provide health, education, and other goods and services as a backstop to government and firm
obligations108. This has greatly reduced its ability to act as a force for structural change, notes Edwards.
Moreover, civil society initiatives have increasingly invited market values and methodologies into their
public-oriented missions. A recent Vox investigation examined the extent the World Health Organization
(WHO) has contracted big management consultancy firms, with $300 million going to McKinsey and
BCG alone 109. Again, the playbook was to deploy management methods so as to make the public health
process more efficient, with well-being as the outcome (as opposed to profit).
But it’s not working. “The theory [is] if you spend money on consultants, even if only for strategic
advice, it would have some impact on your efficiency. You’d expect some gain,” said Ian Kirkpatrick,
author of the study “NHS management consultants proven to worsen a service already under pressure.110”
“We actually find there is no gain.”
“The consultants could not understand our humanitarian business and their recommendations were
completely irrelevant,” echoes Mukesh Kapila, former undersecretary general for the International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies111. Their private sector models have been a
“complete failure … a complete and utter waste.” The irony, of course, is that when public missions fail,
it’s the government or civil society that takes the public perception hit, sparking yet more of an urgency to
make non-market entities to be “run like a business”.
The story of efficiency, then, it’s just so hard to break. But reality doesn’t care. The increasing imbalance
between the market, government, and civil society is not working. The conflation of 1918 (pandemic),
1929 (depression), and 1968 (civil unrest) in a span of two months tells as much. And while the issues
rooting the crises are decades in the making, it’s been a slow-enough boil to keep the shreds of the path
dependency intact. Until now. The frog is out of the stew. The Reagan-Thatcher world system is dead and
dying. The question now turns to “What next?”
Increasingly, even VC firms are asking this question. Geoff Lewis, the founder of the investment firm
Bedrock, recently tweeted: “wanted: mckinsey but for helping companies undo/reverse whatever
mckinsey recommended over the past thirty years. will fund.112”
The question of “what next” can only be answered one of two ways: the creation of a more democratic,
equitable way, or to a less democratic, equitable way. The playbook for the latter has defined the Trump
presidency: a mix of increased laissez-faire with culture warring to get the working classes to turn in on
themselves. The playbook for the former requires a key first step, or the awareness, asserts sociologist
Immanuel Wallerstein, “that all systems…have determinate lives. They are not eternal. They have a
period of origin, followed by a longish period of development and the ‘normal’ functioning, and finally a
period of structural crisis which is also an era of transition.”
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Translation: our economic system is manmade and not handed down from some higher order. We broke
it, but it can evolve into something else.
Wallerstein goes on to note that systems die under the weight of their “contradictions”. This paper has
teased out this contradiction: economic progress has come with societal regress, i.e., growth has been
decoupled from well-being. That contradiction has been fed by the policy paradigm efficiency as a means
and profit as an end. It says here that the replacing policy paradigm is resiliency as a means and wellbeing as an end. “This latest crisis provides an opportunity to rebalance the imperatives of social
solidarity with the dynamism of the market to enhance the legitimacy of government,” explains John
Thornhill in The Financial Times113.
***
The argument for a more egalitarian capitalism is hardly new. The term “inclusive growth” has been the
buzzword policy-wise for some time. In Cleveland, the term is tossed around like a football, with
numerous civil society- and government-sponsored events aimed at softening the touch of the market114.
But such efforts act as a band-aid to the breakage. Federal policy prescriptions, for instance, have recently
been introduced at the highest levels of government, with New York Senator Chuck Schumer and New
Mexico Senator Martin Heinrich introducing a bill that would require the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) to supplement its quarterly GDP figures with an “income growth indicator,” or IGI, that measures
how growth is distributed across each decile of earners115.
The proposed IGI is but one attempt to address the contradictions of the current system. The strategy is
intuitive. “If we measure the wrong thing, we will do the wrong thing,” as the Nobel-winning economist
Joseph Stiglitz wrote. Yet while adding inclusive growth to the scorecard is laudable, the issue is deeper
than one of misguided measurement. Inclusive growth is less about whether measuring the wrong thing
will lead to doing the wrong thing, and more about whether valuing the wrong things lead to measuring
the wrong things that lead to doing the wrong things. The collective gauge of societal value: that’s what’s
broke, and a new economic narrative is required to help fix it.
The leader of that new narrative build is arguably American-educated and UK-based economist Mariana
Mazzucato, whose been referenced across the ideological spectrum—from Republican Senator Marc
Rubio116 to Pope Francis117 to Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez118. In her book “The Value of
Everything: Making and Taking in the Global Economy”, Mazzucato argues that things broke when our
economy pivoted from a system in which value drove price to one in which price drove value. In early
agrarian economies, for instance, the value of labor drove the value of the crop. Embedded in each was
the inherent value to society—to eat so as to sustain life! But in modern national accounting systems,
value gets abstracted formulaically. “In GDP we don’t make any value judgements,” Mazzucato said,
other than to say what has a price must be valued119. Pollution thus counts positively in GDP because we
have to pay people to clean it up. Same with sickness in healthcare, imprisonment in corrections, and
bankruptcy proceedings in finance.
“If we don’t know the difference between value creation and value extraction activities … we risk passing
off anything included in GDP as value creation,” Mazzucato said. “In the process we reward those
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activities, so it becomes sort of a feedback loop: because they’re valuable, we consider them valuable and
they will be valued by society so policymakers will try to increase those activities, and that then also
increases those activities’ share of GDP.”
How consumer tech is deployed
Figure 58: Top Firms by R&D Expenditures (in millions). Source:
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For example, Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg is under pressure to control the misinformation that is
allowed to flow through his platform, particularly political messaging via the likes of President Trump.
On a recent CNBC appearance, Zuckerberg balked at the notion that social networks should be "the
arbiter of truth"121. In effect, he’s saying Facebook’s existence as a knowledge economy firm is to create
efficiencies in how they make money, and how that make money is in precision advertising, which makes
up 98.2% of the firm’s revenue as of Q4 2019122. It’s a bit of a twisted logic, really. The firm has no
obligations to civil society, yet their product—the social network—is literally conceived as the lifeblood
of civil society.
As such, Facebook has countless tentacles that touch so much of civic life. Most famously, Facebook’s
research partnership with Cambridge Analytica—a political consulting firm with ties to Cambridge
University’s Psychometric Centre at the Cambridge Judge Business School—enabled a campaign of
misinformation that impacted the 2016 U.S. presidential election123. The process for this occurrence was
relatively straightforward: Facebooks’ data on millions of people was used to create algorithms by
researchers that analyzed what made people “tick”. Politically-charged information was then created to
illicit network effects and mold voter behavior via Facebook’s platform.
"Cambridge Analytica sought to identify mental and emotional characteristics in certain subsets of the
American population and worked to exploit them by designing them to activate some of the worst
vulnerabilities in people, such as neuroticism, paranoia and racial biases," explained Christopher Wylie, a
former Cambridge Analytica data scientist, to the Senate Judiciary Committee in May of 2018124.
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Dubbed “mind hacking” by philosopher Yuval Noah Harari, increases in data and computing power—
coupled with a good understanding of neurobiology—have progressively allowed the proprietors of data
capital to enter into the “attic” of our motivations. “…[A]nd once they can hack you,” explained Harari,
“they can not only predict your choices, but also reengineer your feelings125”. That’s because stimuli by
its nature stimulates, igniting an emotion which prompts a behavior (e.g., “like”) that further fuels the
algorithm for the next round of stimuli—the process, in effect, creating an echo between the digital and
biological that’s played out in the day-to-day.
A recent New York Times piece called “Facebook Fueled Anti-Refugee Attacks in Germany, New
Research Suggests” is apropos126. It discusses a study out of the University of Munich that showed
wherever per-person Facebook use rose to one standard deviation above the national average, attacks on
refugees increased by about 50 percent. Why? The first part of the answer was previously intimated:
Facebook’s ad revenues are based on its treasure trove of data capital, and its data capital is dependent on
user engagement. “Posts that tap into negative, primal emotions like anger or fear…perform best and so
proliferate.127” The algorithm learns this and adjusts accordingly, albeit within a vacuum of virtue.
The second part of the answer relates to the public consequences that follow when private value is derived
through the stoking of lower-order processes. In Germany, individuals were being fed anti-refugee
sentiment by “superposters” whose “exaggerated worldviews play well on the algorithm, allowing them
to dominate newsfeeds.128 This, then, incited predisposed Facebook users to act against local refugee
communities under the presumption hate was the norm. Or, as business strategist Tom Peters recently
tweeted: “Facebook Credo: Profit Maximization Through Maximized Monetized Rage Production.129”
The knowledge economy as it has evolved is pretty dumb.
The alternative is to take a more circular approach to economic and human development, or one that ties
the market to the production of well-being as opposed to its consumption. Returning to the theory of
change espoused above, the evolutionary model we need is to go from agrarian economy, to industrial
economy, to knowledge economy, to “knowledge society”, described as a society that generates and
makes available to all citizens knowledge that may be used to improve the human condition130. Instead,
the knowledge economy today uses human capital as an input to innovation as opposed to an output from
innovation. Put another way, the goal of economic activity is still a thing or a service to be consumed by
people with means, not the production and dissemination of knowledge so people can grow their capacity
to have means.
This is to say, then, that technological advance can be destructive if not deployed for instructive intent.
The healthcare industry grows via innovations in treating a sickening populace, an epidemic of ill health
tied to innovation in the agricultural sector that led to the mass production of low-cost, if nutritionally
deficient, food. Meanwhile, the housing industry—through innovations in finance—has increasingly
profiteered for the few at the dispossession of the many. Then there’s the economic development industry,
the aim of which is to help cities succeed in the knowledge economy. Here, the strategy is consistently
one of “brain gain” and “brain drain”—e.g., what can places do to attract and retain talent—when the real
problem is “brain waste”: the unrealized potentialities in a city’s own “backyard”.
There’s got to be a better way of doing things—a more humane way of using human ingenuity. The last
section looks to the case of Cleveland as to how this better way can play out.
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Healing Cleveland’s Economy
Cleveland is a global healthcare provider131. Patients come from all over for care. And when they’re not
coming, the region, via the Cleveland Clinic, brings the hospital to them, with outposts worldwide 132.
Then there’s the virtual office. Telemedicine is riding the death of distance movement so that Cleveland
doctors and nurses can care for Clevelanders and non-Clevelanders alike without the time and cost
constraints of a commute. Cleveland, thus, exports healthcare services, making it a large part of the
regional economy. This is evidenced by regional job growth trends across time, showing that employment
in Healthcare and Social Services and in Hospitals is outpacing total employment (See Figure 59).
Figure 59: Employment Growth in the Cleveland MSA, 1990 to 2019 (Index 1990 = 100). Source: Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
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To what extent are healthcare jobs clustering in the Cleveland MSA compared to peer regions?
Answering, the location quotient (LQ) for skilled healthcare occupations was examined for the largest 40
MSAs nationally. An LQ is an analytical statistic that measures a region's industrial specialization relative
to the nation. It can reveal what makes a particular region “unique”. The higher the LQ, the higher the
likelihood a good or service, like healthcare, is being sold outside a given market. The highest LQ (3.7) in
the nation for Healthcare Practitioners and Technical Occupations is in Rochester, MN, home to the Mayo
Clinic. Among the top 40 labor markets with a more diverse industry base, Pittsburgh is 1st with an LQ of
1.29, followed by Cleveland (1.26) (See Figure 60).
Figure 60: Location Quotient of Healthcare Practitioners and Technical Occupations for Largest 40 Metros.
Source: Occupational Employment and Statistics, May 2019.
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Cleveland’s globalized healthcare scene is
particularly concentrated in Cuyahoga County.
The county ranks as having the 7th most hospital
employees in the nation, despite being the 35th
largest by population (See Table 7). This figure—
combined with the fact that 9.8% of its total
employment is in hospitals, 3rd only to Boston’s
Suffolk County and Philadelphia County—is
another indication to the extent healthcare is
agglomerating locally.

Table 7: Top 10 Counties Nationwide by Total Hospital
Employment. Source: County Business Patterns, 2017.
Number of
% of Total
Employees
Employees in
for Hospitals
Hospitals
Los Angeles County

162,879

4.3%

Cook County

121,563

5.1%

New York County

99,441

4.4%

Harris County

96,346

4.7%

Suffolk County

88,805

13.9%

Given Cuyahoga County’s acumen and status as a Philadelphia County
67,244
10.6%
world-class healthcare provider, one could
Cuyahoga County
64,661
9.8%
surmise that those resources would translate into
Maricopa County
63,752
3.8%
good, if not excellent, local public health. But
Dallas
County
49,134
3.3%
that’s not the case. According to the University of
San Diego County
49,031
3.9%
Wisconsin’s Population Health Institute 2020
th
figures, Cuyahoga County ranks 75 out of 88
counties in health outcomes for the State of Ohio (See Figure 61). Ohio’s Appalachian counties are the
only ones that rank below it.
This incongruence is present at smaller geographies as well. The City of Cleveland’s Health Tech
Corridor (HTC) is a 2.87 square mile stretch that runs from Downtown Cleveland to Cleveland’s
University Circle. That little stretch houses nearly 40% of Cuyahoga County’s healthcare and social
assistance jobs, despite comprising only 0.6% of the county’s land mass. Yet the HTC is also home
neighborhoods with some of the worst health outcomes. An analysis of the census tracts that are most
vulnerable to COVID-19 complications—as gauged by the concentration of residents 65 and older, as
well as areas with the highest prevalence of high blood pressure, cardiovascular disease, diabetes, cancer,
and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD)—revealed that two of the top five most vulnerable
census tracts in Ohio were within the HTC’s boundaries (See Figure 62).
Figure 61: Health Outcome Rankings State of Ohio. Source: 2020 County Health Rankings.

Figure 62: Neighborhoods by Density of Vulnerable Populations to Covid-19. Source: 2018 5-Year ACS, CDC
500 Cities Project, 2019.

Increasingly, education and healthcare, or the “eds and meds”, has become a globalized industry.
Hospitals and universities have taken on the air of a worldwide headquarters, or a place in a city—not
necessarily of the city—where innovation happens so a good or service is bettered, if only so market share
is grown. In the case of name brand hospital systems, the quality and efficiency of care is important, but
so is a path to more profit. The organizational missions that don’t create a beeline to that end can be
overlooked. Specifically, a global hospital can become divorced from its local community, with
population health becoming a no-brainer that few people think about. “That’s a good direction to go,” said
former Cleveland Clinic CEO Toby Cosgrove in 2017 when asked how Cleveland’s health disparities can
be lessened. “But how much can we do in population health?133”
Fast forward to April 2020 and Cosgrove attempted to answer his own question in a co-authored Politico
piece134. Cosgrove, a Vietnam veteran, explained that the double whammy of COVID-19 and a spike in
unemployment rates could be an opportunity to build a public health workforce he dubbed the “Health
Care Ready Reserve”. Consider it an “army” of people whose skills are repurposed and aimed at
protecting public health, not unlike President Roosevelt’s Works Progress Administration (WPA) that
retooled the underemployed, pivoting their labor toward unprecedented levels of infrastructure and
cultural development. “Of course we will provide useful work for the needy unemployed,” Roosevelt
remarked in 1936, “we prefer useful work to the pauperism of the dole.135”
Cosgrove argues that good health could be fostered by putting money in people’s pockets as they tended
to the health needs within their local communities. Moreover, resiliency can get baked into an
increasingly strapped healthcare labor force, with reserve workers freeing up caregivers for direct care as
they are trained to “help administer Covid-19 tests, follow up on contact tracing of people who’ve been
exposed to the virus, provide relief to exhausted medical staff, and perform vital logistical tasks such as
133
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food distribution and disinfection.136” Even after this novel virus has passed, Cosgrove argues,
participation in the reserve force “could provide a steppingstone for workers to transition from shrinking
parts of the economy to those, like home health care, that are growing.” It would also allow a level of
preparedness for the arrival of the next novel virus, which is less a question of “if” but “when137”.
This is a good example of how investment and human capital can be pointed toward a need, with more
investment and human capital generated as an effect of the response. And while Cosgrove was
strategizing nationally, it’s likely the experience in Cleveland was an influence in this worldview. Plainly,
the Clinic is a world-class health system that existed side-by-side with the unhealthiest of neighborhoods.
But there’s a surplus of untapped labor in those neighborhoods, which could be pointed toward
population health demands. It’s a perfect proving ground in changing how the economics of health works.
In doing so, Cleveland could change the world by changing Cleveland.
***
But is there a will for such endeavors? Or more pointedly: Can Cleveland develop a population health
model that’s an envy of the world?
Well, this assumes that (1) Cleveland’s government, its market, and its civil society organizations can
agree that population health is not only important, but it’s of the utmost of importance; and (2) there’s a
collective recognition that the copycat-like fetishization of needing to evolve into a Quaternary,
technology-sectored economy doesn’t in itself doesn’t mean anything, unless there is a particular societal
aim that technology can serve—as opposed to society serving a particular technological aim.
Getting to a consensus that population health is an issue to rally around should be straightforward. To put
it most crudely, knowledge drives economic growth, as does manual labor. Each are underpinned by the
soundness of body and mind. Unpacking the obvious, there’s a strong correlation between life expectancy
and per capita income. Figure 63 plots out that relationship for the census tracts in Cuyahoga County,
with higher per capita income tracts strongly associated with longevity (r2 = .78).
Figure 63: Life Expectancy v. Per Capita Income for Census Tracts in Cuyahoga County. Source: U.S. Smallarea Life Expectancy Estimates Project – USALEEP, 2010-2015 and ACS 5-Year, 2011-2015.
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Of course, there’s bi-directionality at play. Does health drive income or income drive health? Policy-wise,
there’s a bias to imply the latter. Elaborating, when it comes to economic development, it’s usually a onedirectional strategy: skill-up workers for more income, which will then “trickle down” to better access to
care and better health. But the current analysis has extensively showed how labor market trends are
increasingly divorced from well-being via the automation of labor, the bifurcation of the labor market,
and the cost-cutting and profit-seeking behaviors of firms that imbalance the scales between labor and
capital. This—combined with the fact that the financialization of healthcare has meant costs have doubled
at the rate of wage growth over the last decade138—translates into a strategy that’s not working. Hence,
the poor health outcomes nationally, and the lack of preparedness in public health emergencies that
COVID-19 has laid ruthlessly bare.
Alternatively, an argument can be made for economic development policies to take a less circuitous route
toward well-being. This means investing heavily in population health, not unlike Cleveland does for
education (See “Say Yes to Cleveland”139). For instance, a recent study called “Health and economic
growth: Evidence from dynamic panel data of 143 years,” showed a nation’s per capita income and GDP
per capita growth rate were more causally affected by life expectancy than other key variables, including
schooling140. “The probable channels through which life expectancy is envisaged to foster growth is
through capital accumulation and boosting productivity…”, the author notes. Put simply, better health
leads to higher productivity of the worker, a benefit to the firm. And more working years for the worker
meant more savings and wealth, which has a generational effect. “Policy implication that follows…is that
per capita income can be boosted through focused policy attention on population health,” the author
concludes.
The argument can be made that Cleveland has begun to rally around the issue of population health.
Recently, there’s been a government and civil society effort to fund lead prevention efforts to the tune of
$10.1 million as of late 2019141. Infant mortality efforts are also underway, such as First Year
Cleveland142. Yet the efforts are piecemeal. They are civil society and government efforts that are not
embedded in market efforts, rather they are reactive efforts to the comings and goings of a profit-first
market.
Take lead. Much of childhood lead exposure is via the deterioration of the city’s aging housing stock. Yet
this deterioration is downstream from housing finance practices that lead to the underfinancing of
traditional mortgages in poorer neighborhoods on one hand, and the over-leveraging of unfair, sub-prime
mortgages in those same neighborhoods on the other. Housing disinvestment, then, is downstream from a
lack of middle-income job opportunities, which is downstream from laissez-faire policy practices, etc.
Population health, then, is a “wicked problem”. These are problems that are complex, systemic,
interconnected, and urgent143. Wicked problems need to be met with an approach that is mission-oriented,
not unlike how the U.S. marshalled attention, investment, and innovation to put a man on the moon.
Historically, however, such missions have not been pointed at societal aims. In Richard Nelson’s 2011
book “The Moon and the Ghetto”, he asks why innovation has led to such demanding feats as landing a
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man on the moon, yet the problems of living continue to me bet with technologically unsavvy
approaches144.
According to economist Mariana Mazzucato, an emerging policy approach to tackle wicked problems is
called “mission-oriented innovation policies”, described as “systemic public policies that draw on frontier
knowledge to attain specific goals, or ‘big science deployed to meet big problems’”145. In other words, it’s
an approach that leans in on the technological advances of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, allowing the
power of innovation to solve social problems as it does market efficiency problems. If it sounds intuitive,
it is. The issue is with implementation, as so much of innovation unthinkingly gets pushed into the market
due to the aforementioned imbalance between government, civil society, and the market. Alternatively,
government—backstopped with the humanistic high-ground of the civil society—can use both the power
of the purse and the polls to co-create market forces. Put simply, government needs to get its groove back,
led less by actors, and more by governors. Notes Mazzucato:
“To reap the substantial benefits from this approach, what is needed is to abandon the ideology that often
informs, and misinforms, the role that the state can play in the economy. Public, private, and third sector
actors can work together in new ways to co-create and shape the markets of the future…Only in this way
can investment-led growth help address not only the growth problem but help solve the wicked 21stcentury challenges ahead.”
Contrast this approach to how economic development has recently been done in Cleveland. Arguably the
biggest innovation-led economic development policy push of recent memory was that of “Blockland”146,
the aim of which was to capitalize on blockchain technology as a means to make firms and government
more efficient. But yet another way to “lean and mean” everything in the name of profit is simply not on a
top 10 list of what the Cleveland collective needs right now, at least if an honest scan of the local
landscape is had. Worse, limited government and civil society funds subsidized the effort, if only because
a narrative took hold, capturing the public’s imagination. It was the story and the personalities behind the
effort that got folks attention, as opposed to the strategy being conceptually rigorous.
A potentially more conceptually sound economic development strategy underway in Cleveland is around
the “Internet of Things”, which is a systematic way to increase information across geographies and
domains via the deployment of connected devices147. But if that approach is simply about making firms
more efficient, then its economic development aims will fall short, if not make things worse. What must
be imbued in the effort are societal values, or an understanding that it’s not the increased information in
how “things” work that’s important, but rather how the information derived from how things work can be
used to better the lives of the people that make the things work. How, for instance, can medical devices
and sensors be used to better population health?
That we are at a societal tipping point while having more access to technology than ever, well, it seems
counterintuitive. But when you unpack how our tools have been used, it’s not. As noted by the University
College of London’s Nicholas Maxwell, the issue boils down to the fact that man’s need to solve the
problems of science have not been met with equal energy spent on the problems of living148. “It is…of
decisive importance to appreciate that all global problems have arisen because of a massive increase in
scientific knowledge and technology without a concomitant increase in global wisdom,” Maxwell notes.
He goes on to explain that as long as we lacked modern science, the lack of wisdom—described as the
capacity to understand what is of value in life for oneself and for others—mattered less, as the ability to
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wreak havoc was limited. “Now that our power to act has been so massively enhanced by modern science
and technology, global wisdom has become, not a luxury, but a necessity.”
The future of growth, then, is exactly that. It will not be recreated by gluing back the vestiges of the 20th
century. It will be principled on quality of life, not the quantity of lives. On resiliency, not efficiency. On
the production of well-being, not its consumption.
The time is now. 2020 is the year when the luxury of our illusions left. What’s left on the other side is
either something for the better, or something for the worse. But the urgency to heal is arguably as high as
it’s ever been.

